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Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP68B00969R000100070040-9

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*Knache's memo  
for DDCL. To WSE 1400 1 July.  
OK. He will give original  
to Knache.*

We have one general comment on the overall thrust of your paper: we see closer and earlier integration between collection systems design and the needs of exploitation as doing more, to ease NPIC's situation than anything else. You mention this in paragraph 6 of your recommendations, but you do not make a point of it in your discussion. I believe you should. It was one of the principal building blocks of our report--perhaps the most fundamental point we made.

In the first paragraph of the first page of your discussion: you might wish to qualify the paragraph by specifying that if NPIC were to work no overtime its PI capacity is sufficient to cope only with first and second phase readout  annually.

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On the third page of your discussion you favor creating a COMEX within COMOR rather than as a separate standing committee of USIB. We considered this, of course, but we came to the conclusion that a separate committee would be more effective. Our concern was that within COMOR differences between targetting and exploitation would be settled by vote. The hard-headed decision would be hard to come by. If targetting and exploitation were handled in separate, co-equal committees, differences would be decided by the Chairman of USIB. We think this a more effective way of doing business.

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On the fourth page of your discussion and in your recommendation number three you take up the matter of security compartmentation. You will recall that I said merely that this was a problem that exceeded the scope of a survey of NPIC, and that I would propose it for further study. I have now made further inquiries and have a memorandum in preparation. This came up before USIB on 5 November 1964 and the USIB agreed to refer it to the Security Committee and COMOR for study. It was put on the COMOR agenda but was taken off at DIA request, because DIA could not get the various DoD factions to agree on a DoD position. The issue has been virtually dormant for nearly a half-year. We found COMOR moving to get it back on the track, and [ ] told us he expected to be able to go to USIB with a COMOR position in 4 to 6 weeks. [ ] and [ ] are working up the CIA position. I believe that appropriate action is already being taken. I might also note that this is not CIA's problem to solve. We can take the lead, but it is really USIB's problem. Since the President established the special security control system [ ] only he could authorize a relaxation.

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On the fifth page of your discussion you refer to the possibility of farming out certain tasks to PI units other than NPIC. We urged this in our survey of three years ago. We did not repeat the recommendation in our latest report because we doubt its feasibility. Experience with field read out and with SAC's scanning operations suggests that only NPIC has the unbiased competence needed to do the job. I believe we were told that a target is not put into the Target Data Inventory until it has been confirmed by NPIC. SAC is too much inclined to see silos in what turns out to be only hen-scratches. Field read out is just plain sloppy. Although redundancy is costly in man-hours, it probably is necessary. Secretary McNamara, for example, has come to look upon NPIC as the one place he can go for an unbiased interpretation.

On pages 6 and 7 of your discussion you urge an amalgamation of some of the DD/I analytical effort with NPIC. We see need for closer communication between photo interpretation and analysis, but we do not favor amalgamation. DIA does it, you know, in its Production Center in Arlington Hall. The analysts and the PIs work as teams--or so we are told. The flaw is a loss of objectivity: analytical judgment influences photo interpretation. We were told that the massive military OB study being made by NPIC was requested by Secretary McNamara because he mistrusted the objectivity of DIA's combined analyst/PI effort. It might be feasible to somehow combine analysts with the CIA departmental effort (although we do not favor even this), but it would be quite improper to put CIA analysts into the national PI effort.

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Re your recommendation number 8: This is going to take some high-level doing. DoD is the principal consumer of the immediate readout. They operate the bulk of the collection systems. I doubt that they would be content with delayed readout unless they were told from the very top that they had to be content.

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